ON  THE  CONSOLIDATION 


OF  THE 


WORCESTER  AND  WESTERN  RAILROADS. 


By  CHARLES  BECK. 


EXPLANATION. 

A  few  words  are  required  to  explain  the  reasons  which 
induced  the  writer  of  these  pages  to  make  his  views  on  the 
subject  of  the  Consolidation  of  the  Worcester  and  Western 
Railroads  known.  It  will  be  remembered  that  this  important 
subject  having  been  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Canals  and 
Railroads,  the  majority  of  the  Committee  made,  towards  the 
close  of  the  session,  an  oral  report  adverse  to  consolidation, 
while  Mr.  Hopkins,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the  part  of 
the  House,  made  a  very  able  and  elaborate  report  in  favor  of 
the  measure.  Some  surprise,  not  to  say  indignation,  was  ex¬ 
pressed  in  some  quarters  at  the  proceeding  of  the  majority  in 
not  preparing  a  written  report.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of 
this  omission,  it  was  not  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  Committee 
had  not  spent  sufficient  time,  and  devoted  sufficient  attention, 
to  the  investigation  of  the  subject. 

If  I  had  not,  during  the  closing  weeks  of  the  session,  been 
kept  by  sickness  from  my  seat,  when  the  report  came  before 


11 


3 

3  (eStJr 


the  House,  I  should  have  availed  myself  of  an  opportunity  to 
explain  and  justify  my  assent  to  the  majority  report.  What  I 
could  not  say  then,  I  wish  to  say  now,  —  that  I  have  conscien¬ 
tiously  endeavored  to  collect  all  the  facts  in  the  case,  to  listen 
attentively  to  the  able  arguments  for  and  against  the  measure, 
and  to  form  my  own  conclusions.  Not  being  a  business  man, 
and  least  of  all  a  railroad  man,  I  think  it  very  probable  that  I 
may  have  misapprehended  facts,  overlooked  important  circum¬ 
stances,  and  drawn  erroneous  conclusions.  All  I  claim  is,  that 
I  was  earnest  and  zealous  in  my  search  after  light,  and  brought 
to  the  investigation  that  very  moderate  share  of  common-sense 
with  which  Providence  has  endowed  me.  Possibly  the  very  fact 
of  my  practical  inexperience  in  railroad  matters  may  have  saved 
me  from  the  danger  of  yielding  to  pre-conceived  notions,  and 
enabled  me  to  look  at  the  subject  free  from  any  bias.  My  col¬ 
leagues  of  the  Legislature  of  ’64,  to  whom  I  think  an  account 
of  my  share  in  the  matter  due,  will  form  their  own  independent 
opinion. 


\ ^  Fl  &  15  UOCViKfc  V ru ,*& 5* 


THE  CONSOLIDATION  OF  THE  WORCESTER  AND 
WESTERN  RAILROADS, 


In  considering  the  subject  of  the  Consolidation  of  the  Wor¬ 
cester  and  Western  Railroads,  referred  to  the  Committee  on 
Canals  and  Railroads,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
question  is  the  simple,  practical  one,  whether  the  petition  for 
the  consolidation  of  the  two  roads  should  or  should  not  be 
granted ;  and  not  the  general  question,  whether  Massachusetts 
should  or  should  not  adopt  the  policy  of  consolidation.  Mr. 
Hopkins,  in  his  able  and  interesting  report,  chose  to  travel 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  subject  referred  to  the  Committee, 
and  discuss  the  latter  subject.  The  starting  from  an  ingenious 
theory,  and  deducing  therefrom  the  principles  which  are  to  regu¬ 
late  action  in  single  cases,  has  something  very  attractive ;  but 
the  safer  method  is  to  act  wisely,  justly,  and  circumspectedly 
on  the  individual  cases  as  they  present  themselves,  and  con¬ 
struct,  naturally  and  logically,  from  a  sufficient  number  of  in¬ 
dividual  cases,  a  policy.  A  definite  policy  should  be  a  result- — 
not  a  starting-point;  it  should  grow  —  not  be  made.  It  is  un¬ 
doubtedly  true  that,  to  some  extent,  every  one  who  wishes  to 
act  satisfactorily  in  a  particular  case,  must  have  formed  some 
general  principles  which  are  to  govern  the  individual  cases; 
but  great  cure  should  be  taken  not  to  indulge  in  the  building 
up  of  a  fair  theory,  and  then,  when  a  particular  case  is  to  be 
acted  upon,  to  be  either  obliged  to  abandon  the  theory  in 
order  to  do  justice  to  the  existing  emergency,  or  to  cling  to 
the  pre-conceived  theory  to  the  injury  of  the  interest  imme¬ 
diately  to  be  attended  to. 

jo  35256 


4 


I  have  no  pre-conceived  theory  on  the  subject  of  consolida¬ 
tion.  I  consider  it  as  a  practical  question.  A  railroad  must 
be  of  a  certain  extent  to  be  worked  profitably.  A  railroad  of 
a  few  miles  in  length  must  have  .as  much  rolling-stock  and  as 
many  men  as  another  of  twice  or  thrice  its  length.  The 
shorter  road  has  employment  for  its  rolling-stock  and  men  a 
portion  only  of  each  day,  —  both  the  rolling-stock  and  men  being 
idle  the  remainder  of  the  day,  —  and,  consequently,  to  this  ex¬ 
tent,  a  non-remunerating  investment.  Such  a  road  will  very  soon 
be  bankrupt,  unless  it  finds  safety  in  consolidation  with  another 
road.  For  if  it  attempts  to  retrench  its  expenses  by  reducing 
its  equipment,  it  will  fail  to  satisfy  the  just  expectations  of  the 
community,  as  to  regular  and  efficient  accommodation;  or  if  it 
attempt  to  keep  up  a  sufficient  equipment  without  having  full 
employment  for  it,  the  outlay  will  soon  exceed  the  income.  I 
have,  however,  no  doubts  whatever  that  consolidation  must  have 
a  limit,  beyond  which  it  works  injuriously.  The  point  where  it 
may  or  should  cease,  and  independent  action  commence,  is 
evidently  when  a  road  is  able  to  keep  up  and  employ  con¬ 
stantly,  and  therefore  with  profit,  an  equipment  which  satisfies 
all  the  just  demands  of  the  business  community.  This  point 
may  be  reached  by  one  road  of  twenty-five,  by  another  of 
thirty,  by  another  of  forty  miles.  The  length  of  a  road  is 
not  a  decisive  criterion ;  other  elements  come  in  to  affect  the 
result.  But  when  a  railroad  has  reached  the  point  of  inde¬ 
pendent  and  self-sustaining  action —  that  is,  when,  in  order  to 
live,  it  does  not  depend  on  union  or  consolidation  with  another 
road  — the  policy  of  consolidation  should  cease,  and  that  of 
co-operation  begin.  Before  this  point  of  independent,  self- 
sustaining  action  is  reached,  consolidation  is  the  proper  policy. 

This  being  my  opinion  of  consolidation,  instead  of  adopting 
and  advocating  a  general  theory,  favorable  or  hostile  to  con¬ 
solidation,  I  prefer  to  examine,  carefully  and  conscientiously, 
any  given  case,  with  due  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  commu¬ 
nity  at  large,  of  the  stockholders,  and  of  particular  interests. 
In  this  spirit,  without  any  pre-conceived  theory,  I  propose  to 


5 


consider  the  present  question,  whether  it  is,  or  not,  advisable 
for  the  Committee  to  recommend  to  the  Legislature  the  grant¬ 
ing  of  the  petition  for  the  Consolidation  of  the  Worcester  and 
Western  Railroads.  I  will  take  it  for  granted,  that  a  majority 
of  the  stockholders  of  both  corporations  favored  the  object, 
although  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  evidence  on  this  point 
was,  to  say  the  least,  extremely  confused  and  unsatisfactory. 
Certainly,  the  election  of  a  Board  of  Directors  in  one  of  the 
corporations,  opposed  to  consolidation,  leaves  it  extremely 
doubtful  how  much  weight  is  to  be  attached  to  the  petition. 
I  may  the  more  easily  leave  this  matter  out  of  consideration, 
because,  even  if  the  stockholders  of  both  corporations  were 
unanimous  in  their  wish  for  consolidation,  this  unanimity  would 
undoubtedly  be  an  important  element  with  the  Legislature  in 
forming  their  decision,  yet  it  would  not  be  a  decisive  reason 
for  granting  the  petition.  For  as  the  Legislature  considered 
other  interests  as  well  as  those  of  the  stockholders  when  they 
originally  granted  their  charters,  so  they  are  in  duty  bound  to 
consider  those  other  interests  when  a  very  material  modifica¬ 
tion  of  the  charters  is  asked  for. 

What  are  the  reasons  in  favor  of  the  consolidation  of  the 
two  railroads  j  or,  in  other  words,  what  are  the  benefits  antici¬ 
pated  from  this  consolidation  ? 

The  benefits  are  of  several  kinds.  Some  look  upon  consoli¬ 
dation  as  the  only  means  of  terminating  the  long-continued  and 
apparently  irreconcilable  disputes  concerning  the  division  of 
profits.  Others  expect  from  it  a  more  economical  management, 
and,  consequently,  either  greater  profits  to  the  stockholders  or 
a  reduction  of  prices  for  the  benefit  of  the  public.  Still 
another  party,  and  unquestionably  the  most  important  as  to 
number,  influence,  and  character,  demand  consolidation  as  the 
only  means  for  restoring  the  declining  commercial  prosperity 
of  Boston. 

I.  The  controversy  concerning  the  division  op  profits 
between  the  two  railroads  has  lasted  so  long,  and  has  at  times 
been  carried  on  with  so  much  feeling,  that  it  is  undoubtedly  for 


6 


the  interest  of  all  to  terminate  it;  and,  if  consolidation  will 
bring  about  this  desirable  end,  it  deserves,  for  this  reason 
alone,  serious  consideration. 

Of  the  many  witnesses  who  appeared  before  the  Committee, 
none  treated  of  this  branch  of  the  subject  with  greater  fullness 
than  Mr.  Chapin  and  Mr.  Mason.  While  Mr.  Mason  sketched 
with  great  distinctness  the  outline  of  the  history  of  the  contro¬ 
versy,  Mr.  Chapin  furnished  many  most  valuable  details.  Mr. 
Mason,  after  stating  that  the  controversy  has  lasted  for  twenty 
years,  and  after  giving  a  full  and  accurate  account  of  the  several 
attempts  to  settle  the  difficulty  by  an  award,  just  in  its  prin¬ 
ciple  and  satisfactory  to  the  parties,  but  which,  after  trial, 
proved  unsatisfactory,  and  was  repudiated  by  one  or  the  other 
party,  declares  that,  in  his  opinion,  it  is  impossible  to  discover 
a  just  principle  by  which  the  claims  of  the  two  parties  may  be 
adjusted,  and  that  everything  but  consolidation  has  been  tried, 
and  failed.  It  is  the  conviction  of  Mr.  Mason,  a  conviction  in 
which  Mr.  Chapin  emphatically  concurs,*  that  these  differences 
can  never  be  settled  till  the  companies  are  united  and  their 
interests  identical.  Mr.  Chapin,  in  one  place  of  his  statement, 
expresses  himself  very  briefly,  but  very  strongly,  concerning 
the  difficulties  between  the  two  roads  :  “When  you  come  to  the 
relations  of  the  Boston  and  Worcester  Railroad  and  the  West¬ 
ern  Railroad,  you  find  that  we  are  interested  in  everything  that 
passes  Worcester,  and  they  are  interested  in  it,  and  so  many 
questions  come  that  we  can  not  settle.  I  have  almost  wondered 
myself  that  we  can  not;  but  such  is  the  fact.  We  can  not  and 
do  not.” 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  opinion,  that  consolidation  is  the 
only  means  to  terminate  the  controversy  between  the  two 
roads,  is  certainly  not  based  upon  experience.  All  that  can  be 


*  The  language  of  Mr.  Chapin  on  this  point  is  :  “I  think  it  for  the  public 
interest  —  the  interest  of  the  people  along  the  lines  of  the  roads,  and  of  the 
people  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  State,  who  do  a  large  part  of  their  trade  with 
the  West  by  this  route  —  that  the  two  roads  should  be  consolidated.” 


7 


said  in  its  favor  is,  that  all  other  means  having  failed  to  bring 
about  a  satisfactory  arrangement,  it  is  possible  that  consolida¬ 
tion,  which  has  not  yet  been  tried,  may  do  it  —  certainly  a  very 
slender  basis  for  so  important  a  measure  as  the  consolidation 
of  two  great  and  powerful  corporations. 

But  a  moment’s  consideration  will  show  that  consolidation 
does  not  furnish  the  desired  relief ;  and  this  will  become  most 
apparent  when  we  consider  the  mode  of  bringing  it  about.  It 
is  taken  for  granted  that  this  important  measure  is  not  to  be 
carried  out  by  an  arbitrary,  high-handed  decision  of  the  Legis¬ 
lature,  disregarding  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  parties,  but 
by  a  voluntary  arrangement  of  the  two  parties,  based  upon  a 
just  appreciation  of  the  rights  of  each.  It  will  be  apparent 
that  the  same  difficulty,  which  has  so  often  rendered  a  tem¬ 
porary  arrangement  between  the  two  railroads  impossible,  or, 
when  tried,  unsatisfactory  to  the  one  or  the  other  party,  re¬ 
turns  with  redoubled  force.  It  must  be  plain  to  any  intelligent 
and  fair  man,  that  a  permanent  union  or  consolidation,  duly 
respecting  the  rights  of  the  parties,  involves  the  same  points 
which  have  formed  the  elements  of  the  several  temporary 
arrangements  or  awards.  Are  the  shares  of  the  two  roads  to 
be  considered  of  equal  value,  or  are  the  shares  of  one  road  to 
be  considered  of  more  value  than  those  of  the  other;  and, 
if  so,  of  how  much  more  value  ?  The  value  which  each  party 
attaches  to  its  road  (including  the  expense  of  land  damages, 
construction,  depot  and  merchandise  accommodation,  etc.),  and 
to  the  service  which  the  road  performs,  is,  of  course,  an  ele¬ 
ment  of  the  value  of  the  stock,  and  will  be  as  little,  or  even 
less  accepted  by  the  other  party  in  the  case  of  a  permanent 
arrangement  or  consolidation,  than  in  the  case  of  the  temporary 
ones,  all  of  which  have,  after  trial,  been  rejected  by  one  of  the 
parties,  or  sometimes  by  both,  as  altogether  unequal  and  unfair 
in  their  operation.  But  the  difficulties  which  a  scheme  of  con¬ 
solidation  has  to  encounter,  in  consequence  of  the  different 
values  which  the  two  parties  attach  to  their  property,  are  not 
only  the  same  in  kind  as  those  experienced  in  making  a  tern- 


8 


porary  arrangement,  but  they  are  greater  in  degree.  If  a 
temporary  arrangement  proves  unjugt  to  one  of  the  parties, 
the  injustice  may  be  borne  from  a  consideration  of  the  early 
termination  of  the  arrangement.  But  if  a  permanent  arrange¬ 
ment  proves  unjust,  even  the  comfort  of  looking  forward  to 
the  time  when  it  will  cease,  will  be  taken  away,  for  the  very 
reason  that  the  connection  is  permanent.  It  is  not  to  be 
expected,  therefore,  that  a  permanent  arrangement,  which,  of 
course,  will  labor  under  some  of  the  imperfections,  on  account 
of  which  the  several  temporary  arrangements  or  awards 
have,  after  trial,  been  repudiated  by  one  or  the  other  party, 
will  be  entered  upon  by  the  parties  who  know  that,  if  the 
arrangement  proves  unjust,  there  will  be  no  means  of  escaping 
the  result  or  remedying  the  injustice.  Under  these  circum¬ 
stances,  seeing  the  improbability  of  an  arrangement  being  hit 
upon  that  will  be  just  and  satisfactory  to  both  parties,  I  for 
one  am  not  prepared  to  advise  the  Legislature  to  authorize  a 
consolidation  of  the  two  corporations. 

While  Mr.  Mason  does  not  seem  to  be  aware  that,  to  say 
the  least,  it  would  be  as  difficult  to  settle  the  terms  of  consoli¬ 
dation  as  it  has  proved  to  agree  upon  those  of  a  temporary 
arrangement  —  (he  certainly  does  not,  in  his  argument,  advert 
to  this  phase  of  the  subject)  —  Mr.  Chapin  does  not  overlook 
it.  He  says:  “I  think  we  can  fix  upon  terms  of  union, 
although  we  cannot  upon  terms  of  division ;  because,  in  fixing 
upon  terms  of  union,  we  should  fix  upon  facts  as  they  exist. 
When  we  attempt  to  fix  upon  a  division  of  future  business,  we 
are  fixing  it  upon  facts  which  have  not  yet  come  to  light.  In 
fixing  the  terms  of  union,  I  should  think  the  prospective  value 
of  the  two  roads  would  be  a  fair  element.  If  I  were  going  to 
fix  upon  the  elements  that  should  govern  such  a  calculation,  I 
should  want  to  sit  down  and  examine  subjects  that  might  now 
escape  my  mind.  The  value  of  the  property,  as  property  for 
producing  an  income,  would  undoubtedly  be  one  of  the  first 
elements.  Perhaps  that  covers  the  whole;  but  there  are 
minor  things.  The  value  of  the  roads,  as  sources  of  present 


9 


and  prospective  income,  would  be  the  main  thing.  I  do  not 
think  there  is  so  much  danger  of  doing  injustice  to  the  stock¬ 
holders,  in  determining  the  value  of  their  property,  as  in  deter¬ 
mining  upon  a  division  of  the  profits ;  because  we  have  got  the 
present  condition  of  these  roads,  and  the  amount  of  money 
which  each  has  earned,  from  its  first  start  down  to  the  present, 
is  capable  of  being  demonstrated,  every  dollar  of  it.”  I  should 
be  inclined  to  differ  from  Mr.  Chapin,  and  say,  that  to  fix  upon 
the  terms  of  a  union  is  not  only  not  easier  but  more  difficult 
than  to  devise  a  scheme  of  dividing  the  earnings,  because  an 
additional  element  enters  into  the  account,  which  Mr.  Chapin 
himself  admits  to  be  a  legitimate  element,  viz.,  the  capability 
of  future  development;  or,  as  Mr.  Chapin  calls  it,  “  the  prospec¬ 
tive  value  of  the  two  roads.”  Mr.  Chapin  admits  that  he  has 
not  examined  this  branch  of  the  subject,  and  yet  he  ventures 
to  say  that  he  can  fix  upon  the  terms  of  union.  When  he  un¬ 
dertakes  an  examination  of  the  prospective  value  of  the  two 
roads,  he  will  find  it  a  very  thorny  subject,  and  the  result  at 
which  he  will  arrive,  and  honestly,  too,  will  prove  to  be  merely 
the  opinion  of  an  individual,  from  which  another  individual, 
whose  judgment  is  entitled  to  equal  respect,  will  differ.  Who 
is  bold  enough  to  say  what  will  be  the  prospective  value  of 
the  two  roads,  a  thing  subject  to  so  many  contingencies  which, 
by  a  shrewd  man  may  be  guessed  at,  but  which  it  is  impossible 
to  foretell  with  precision.  And  yet  this  prospective  value  of 
the  property  is  an  element,  and  an  element  that  cannot  be 
winked  out  of  sight,  in  settling  the  relative  value  of  the  two 
kinds  of  property.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  more  this  matter 
of  the  prospective  value  of  the  two  roads  is  considered,  the 
more  evident  it  will  be  to  every  one,  that,  so  far  from  its  being 
easier  to  agree  upon  the  terms  of  an  union  than  upon  the 
terms  of  dividing  the  earnings,  it  is  more  difficult ;  because  it 
is  a  matter  of  opinion  on  which  the  most  intelligent,  expe¬ 
rienced,  and  honest  men  may  differ,  and  because  it  depends  on 
contingencies  which  may  or  may  not  happen.  If  it  has  been 
so  difficult  to  discover  a  principle  or  system  of  dividing  fairly 
2 


10 


and  satisfactorily  the  earnings  of  the  two  roads,  a  matter  in 
which  nothing  but  facts  and  items  capable  of  the  most  accurate 
calculation  are  to  be  considered,  how  can  it  be  expected  that 
an  harmonious  arrangement  can  be  effected  in  a  matter  in 
which,  in  addition  to  the  difficulty  of  dividing  the  earnings,  — 
because  these  go  to  make  up,  in  part,  the  value  of  each  prop¬ 
erty,  —  another  element  comes  in  which  is  merely  a  matter  of 
opinion,  incapable  of  calculation  or  demonstration ;  namely,  the 
prospective  value  of  the  stock. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  longer  on  this  point.  Not  one  of 
the  advocates  of  consolidation,  with  the  exception  of  Mr. 
Chapin,  has  even  alluded  to  the  practical  difficulties  of  arriving 
at  a  fair  and  equitable  adjustment  of  the  terms  of  consolidation. 
Mr.  Chapin  is  evidently  too  much  a  man  of  practical  good 
sense  to  overlook  this  matter  of  the  prospective  value  of  the 
two  roads,  as  an  element  in  settling  the  terms  of  the  union ; 
but  he  has  not  examined  it,  and  neither  he  nor  any  other 
advocate  of  consolidation  proposes  a  plan  of  consolidation 
indicating  what  value,  both  present  and  prospective,  he 
attaches  to  each  stock.  Until  such  a  plan  is  offered,  showing 
that  there  is  a  reasonable  prospect  of  a  satisfactory  result,  it 
can  not  be  expected  of  the  Legislature  to  authorize  the 
preparatory  steps  of  consolidation. 

While  I  appreciate,  to  some  extent,  the  difficulties  which 
have  been  experienced  by  the  two  corporations  in  dividiag 
their  earnings  in  a  fair  and  satisfactory  manner,  I  cannot 
persuade  myself  that  the  common  and  sound  principle  of 
letting  business  take  care  of  itself  should,  in  this  case,  be 
inadequate  and  powerless.  If  co-operation,  or  an  arrangement 
embracing  several  roads,  is  for  the  interest  of  the  several 
roads,  and,  of  course,  of  the  public,  such  an  arrangement  will 
be  made.  It  may  be  difficult  to  ascertain  precisely  the  amount 
of  labor  done  by  each  party,  and  the  amount  of  profit  to  which 
it  is  entitled  for  that  labor,  but  I  can  not  believe  it  to  be 
impossible.  Mr.  Chapin  states:  ‘‘that  until  1854,  there  was 
no  system  by  which  freight  could  be  billed  from  Boston  to  any 


11 


point  west  of  Buffalo.”  “  The  first  step  towards  remedying 
this  difficulty  was  taken  in  July,  ’54,  at  a  meeting  held  in 
Albany,  at  which  all  the  roads  from  this  to  Chicago  were 
represented, —  that  is,  the  Michigan  Central,  the  Great  Western, 
the  New-York  Central,  the  Western,  and  the  Boston  and 
Worcester  roads,  —  and  the  Boston  Board  of  Trade.”  Mr. 
Chapin  says,  later:  “  These  difficulties  have  been  constantly 
lessened  and  lessened  as  competition  has  increased.”  This 
is  the  tendency  of  a  free  business.  It  will  be  so,  nay,  it  has 
been  so,  in  the  co-operation  between  the  Western  and 
Worcester  roads,  as  it  has  in  the  arrangements  with  the 
Western  roads,  so  far  as  it  is  for  the  interest  of  all  parties 
concerned.  To  press  beyond  that  point  may  benefit,  for  a 
time,  some  one  branch  of  business,  some  one  interest,  but  the 
law  of  compensation  will  soon  make  itself  felt. 

II.  Economy  op  Management.  Almost  every  one  who  has 
appeared  as  a  witness  in  favor  of  consolidation,  has  expressed 
the  opinion  that  a  union  of  the  two  roads  would  be  followed 
by  a  more  economical  management,  which  would,  of  course, 
result  in  greater  profits  to  the  stockholders  and  cheaper  prices 
to  the  public.  Yet  this  testimony  did  not  remain  uncontro¬ 
verted,  inasmuch  as  many  of  the  witnesses  asserted  that 
consolidation  would  not  result  in  a  reduction  of  expenses. 

On  this  branch  of  the  subject,  we  have  again  the  weighty 
testimony  of  Mr.  Chapin,  which  deserves  careful  consideration. 
He  says :  “  In  regard  to  the  matter  of  consolidation,  while  I 
believe  the  present  arrangement  has  been  carried  out  with  a 
good  understanding,  and  perfectly  pleasant  and  amicable 
relations  between  the  several  companies  (for  although  we  have 
differed  a  great  many  times,  very  considerably,  in  our  views  of 
the  way  in  which  business  should  be  done,  we  have  generally 
reconciled  these  differences  one  way  or  the  other),  yet  if  there 
had  been  but  one  interest,  I  can  not  but  believe  that  the 
business,  could  have  been  done  very  much  more  efficiently.  I 
believe  that  if  the  surplus  stock  and  help  that  are  now  upon 
the  roads  between  Albany  and  Boston  were  all  under  one 


12 


direction,  it  would  increase  the  amount  of  work  which  could 
be  done,  very  considerably,  and  no  interest  suffer  from  it.” 

11  In  operating  the  road,  I  have  had  occasion  several  times  to 
see  how  much  work  we  could  get  from  our  engines  and  men. 
In  order  to  have  men  enough  to  run  our  engines  and  do  our 
work  at  all  times,  and  do  it  promptly,  we  are  obliged  to  have 
more  men  than  we  can  use  all  the  time ;  for  our  work  is  not 
like  some  other  kinds  of  work,  running  uniformly  every  day, 
but  varies  considerably.  I  have  found  that  when  we  get 
twenty  days’  work  a  month  out  of  an  engine,  we  get  a  full 
average,  and  many  times  four  days’  work  of  that  time  (task?) 
has  been  done  between  Sunday,  at  3  o’clock,  and  the  next 
Tuesday,  at  3  o’clock.  For  instance :  at  the  Albany  end,  we 
run  a  stock-train  for  the  Harlem  road,  at  3  o’clock,  Sunday ; 
and  then  the  regular  business  on  Monday  morning  takes  all  the 
engines  we  have  got.  They  get  back  to  Albany  about  3  o’clock, 
and  then  it  is  time  for  the  Brighton  stock-train  to  start;  and 
by  the  time  they  get  back,  it  is  time  for  the  regular  trains  on 
Tuesday  to  start;  and  then,  the  stock-trains  being  over,  the 
rest  of  the  week  the  work  is  lighter;  and  the  less  surplus 
help  we  have,  in  order  to  meet  such  emergencies,  the  less  time  is 
lost  by  the  men  lying  over  the  time  when  the  business  is  light.” 

Mr.  Chapin  does  not  carry  out  his  illustration,  but  it  is  plain 
what  he  is  aiming  at.  He  wants  to  show  that  the  business  at 
the  Albany  end  of  the  road,  requiring  surplus  engines  and  men, 
between  Sunday,  3  o’clock,  and  Tuesday,  3  o’clock,  to  carry 
the  stock-trains,  if  there  should  be  a  similar  pressure  of 
business  some  time  between  Tuesday,  3  o’clock,  and  the  follow¬ 
ing  Sunday,  3  o’clock,  somewhere  on  the  Worcester  road,  the 
surplus  engines  and  men  at  the  Albany  end,  if  under  the 
control  of  one  corporation,  could  be  advantageously  employed 
on  the  Worcester  road.  This  is  unquestionably  true ;  but  in 
order  to  make  out  his  case,  Mr.  Chapin  must  prove  two  things, 
viz.;  first,  that  there  exists  such  a  pressure  on  the  Worcester 
road,  and,  secondly,  that  this  pressure  occurs  just  between 
Tuesday  and  Sunday,  when  there  is  a  lull  near  the  western 


13 


end  at  Albany.  But  Mr.  Chapin  does  not  adduce  any  facts  to 
prove  this,  and  rests  satisfied  with  the  theoretical  inference 
which  he  does  not  even  take  the  trouble  of  stating,  that  the 
surplus  engines  and  men  at  the  Albany  end  of  the  road,  if 
under  the  same  direction,  might  be  profitably  employed  on 
some  part  of  the  Worcester  road.  Any  one  will  see  at  a  glance 
how  much  of  the  argument  is  merely  hypothetical,  unsupported 
by  facts.  If  the  Legislature  are  expected  to  authorize  so  im¬ 
portant  a  measure  as  consolidation,  they  ought  certainly  to 
have  a  firmer  basis  for  their  act  than  a  mere  conjecture, 
however  probable,  and  however  deserving  of  attention  as 
coming  from  a  railroad  man  of  large  experience. 

In  another  part  of  his  statement,  Mr.  Chapin  says :  “  It 
would  reduce  a  great  many  of  the  expenses  of  the  roads  very 
considerably;  to  what  extent  is  a  matter  of  conjecture,  or 
opinion,  but  I  should  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  it  would 
reduce  the  joint  expenses  more  than  five  per  cent.  But  the 
great  advantage  would  be  gained,  in  my  opinion,  from  the 
greater  efficiency  that  would  be  given  to  the  road  for  doing 
the  business.  If  the  rolling-stock  of  the  present  two  companies 
was  under  the  direction  of  one,  it  would  add  to  the  ability  to 
do  the  business  twenty  per  cent.,  perhaps  more ;  because  all 
the  surplus  which  each  road  now  has  would  then  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  any  point.  Our  business  is  not  equal ;  it  presses 
sometimes  at  one  point  and  sometimes  at  another.  Like  all 
business,  it  has  its  ups  and  downs.” 

Mr.  Chapin,  here,  as  in  the  extract  above,  confines  himself 
to  a  mere  assertion  —  an  assertion  which,  I  confess,  appears 
extremely  plausible,  but  which  is  not  proved.  If  he  had  given 
us  facts,  which  must  be  in  his  possession,  to  show  that  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  if  not  always,  the  pressure  of  business  on 
one  part  of  the  road  occurs  when  there  is  a  lull  on  another, 
the  argument  would  assume  a  very  different  aspect.  As  the 
case  stands,  without  further  evidence  (and  here  I  must  reiterate 
the  expression  of  my  regret  that,  rich  in  facts  as  the  statement 
of  Mr.  Chapin  is  on  many  points,  he  has  not  furnished  the  facts 


14 


which  are  needed  to  raise  his  assertion,  or  conjecture,  on  this 
point,  to  a  convincing  argument),  I  must  think  it  quite  as 
probable  that  the  pressure  of  business  may  occur  simul¬ 
taneously  on  different  parts  of  the  road,  so  that  the  surplus  of 
rolling-stock  and  men  may,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  be  needed 
on  several  portions  of  the  road,  and  the  profit  expected  from 
a  more  economical  employment  of  the  equipment  will  prove 
illusory. 

Considering,  then,  that  Mr.  Chapin  is  the  only  witness  called 
by  the  friends  of  consolidation  who  made  an  attempt  at 
explaining  how  the  two  roads,  when  consolidated,  could  be 
managed  more  economically,  it  is,  perhaps,  unnecessary  to 
quote  the  testimony  of  some  of  the  witnesses  called  by  the 
opponents  of  consolidation,  tending  to  prove  that  the  saving  in 
the  management  of  the  consolidated  roads,  if  any,  would  be 
trifling.  Mr.  Washburn  stated  “that  both  roads  together 
cannot  be  run  with  one  man  less,  and  that  it  is  bad  economy 
to  employ  inferior  men and  again :  “  the  consolidated  road 
could  not  be  managed  more  cheaply  than  the  separate  ones.” 
Mr.  B.  W.  Lincoln  states :  “  Consolidation  would  not  save 
expense  between  Boston  and  Worcester.  I  do  not  know 
about  the  Western  road.  The  only  saving  would  be  in  clerks 
who  make  the  settlements ;  possibly  one  Treasurer  might  do, 
but  he  would  require  an  Assistant-Treasurer.”  Mr.  Homer 
says :  “  Consolidation  would  not  reduce  expenses.  The  only 
saving  might  possibly  be  the  Treasurer ;  but  the  one  Treasurer 
would  have  an  higher  salary.” 

Considering,  then,  that  with  one  exception  (the  employment 
of  the  rolling-stock  and  men  over  the  entire  extent  of  the 
two  roads),  Mr.  Chapin  does  not  point  out  where  and  wherein 
the  management  of  the  two  roads  would  be  rendered  more 
economical  by  consolidation,  that  he  contents  himself,  as  all  the 
witnesses  called  by  the  friends  of  consolidation,  with  the 
simple  assertion  that  consolidation  would  result  in  greater 
economy,  which  would,  of  course,  accrue  to  the  advantage  of 
either  the  stockholders,  in  the  shape  of  larger  dividends,  or  the 


15 


public,  in  the  shape  of  lower  prices  —  an  assertion  which  is 
controverted  by  the  testimony  or  opinion  of  the  witnesses  on 
the  other  side,  that  consolidation  would  not  result  in  greater 
economy  of  management  —  would  the  Legislature  be  justified  in 
authorizing  an  act  of  consolidation  which  is,  to  say  the  least, 
so  very  doubtful  in  its  result  ?  I,  for  one,  am  not  prepared  to 
take  the  responsibility  of  advising  such  action. 

III.  Benefit  to  the  Commerce  of  Boston. — The  third 
consideration,  which  was  urged  with  greater  and  more  per¬ 
sistent  zeal  than  either  of  the  two  preceding  considerations,  is 
that  consolidation  would  resuscitate  the  declining  commercial 
prosperity  of  Boston.  Mr.  Jewett,  the  counsel  for  the  Boston 
merchants  and  the  Board  of  Trade,  pressed  this  point  with 
great  vigor,  asserting  “that  while  the  interests  of  the  stock¬ 
holders  and  the  local  communities  had  been  looked  to,  the 
interest  of  the  public  at  large  had  been  neglected.  The  roads 
had  failed  to  make  Boston  more  an  exporting  port,  and  con¬ 
solidation  would  do  this;  that  it  was  the  interest  of  the  State 
to  compel  the  roads  to  consolidate.”  Mr.  Converse  stated 
u  that  the  New-England  tj*ade  was  inadequate  to  make  Boston 
what  it  ought  to  be,  if  we  had  the  whole  of  it.” 

Some  might,  perhaps,  object  that  this  was  legislating  in  favor 
of  a  particular  interest  or  class.  I  do  not.  I  entertain  no 
doubt  whatever,  that,  if  the  commerce  of  Boston  should  be 
extended  by  consolidation,  or  any  other  measure,  the  benefit 
would  not  be  confined  to  the  merchants  of  Boston,  but  would 
be  felt  by  every  class  in  every  part  of  the  State.  My  difficulty 
lies  in  another  direction.  The  question  which  naturally  pre¬ 
sents  itself  to  me,  and  to  any  unprejudiced  mind,  is :  What 
are  the  impediments  in  the  way  of  a  greater  and  more  rapid 
expansion  of  the  trade  of  Boston,  and  how  is  the  consolidation 
of  these  two  railroads  to  remove  them  ? 

Considerable  testimony  was  offered  to  show  that  the  trans« 
portation  of  merchandise,  from  and  to  the  West,  was  subject 
to  expense,  delay,  loss,  and  other  inconveniences.  The  testi¬ 
mony  on  this  point  came  from  too  respectable  sources  to  admit 


16 


of  doubt  as  to  its  truth.  Yet,  upon  a  closer  investigation,  it 
turns  out  that  the  cases  complained  of  all  occurred  somewhere 
west  of  Albany.  Mr.  Richardson,  who  has,  on  the  whole,  given 
the  most  precise  account  of  these  inconveniences,  to  which  the 
transportation  of  merchandise  from  and  to  the  West  is 
exposed,  expressly  states  that  they  all  occur  west  of  Albany. 
Mr.  Chapin  refers  briefly  to  this  subject:  “I  do  not  know 
that  any  freight  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  at  Albany  has 
been  delayed,  because  we  had  not  cars  to  bring  it  on.  We 
have  been  obliged  to  get  cars  from  our  neighbors,  but  we  have 
brought  it  on.”  How  can  the  consolidation  of  two  railroads 
in  Massachusetts  prevent  irregularities  on  the  railroads  of 
New  York,  Ohio,  Illinois,  etc.  ?  The  consolidated  road  would, 
of  course,  have  no  direct  power  over  those  roads.  All  that 
could  be  expected  would  be  that  the  consolidated  road,  being  a 
greater  and  more  powerful  corporation,  might  make  its  influence 
upon  other  roads  more  effectually  felt.  I  will  not  advert  here 
to  the  very  serious  consideration  that  the  consolidated  cor¬ 
poration,  being  supposed  strong  enough  to  regulate  and  control 
railroads  beyond  the  borders  of  Massachusetts,  might  exercise 
an  equally  irresistible  influence  over  its  competitors  within  the 
State.  But  supposing  a  perfectly  legitimate  use,  by  the  con¬ 
solidated  corporation,  of  its  increased  power  and  influence,  it 
would  unquestionably  have  to  meet  the  counter-influence  of  the 
roads  terminating  at  Portland,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and 
Baltimore. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  friends  of  consolidation,  who  expect 
so  great  benefit  from  the  measure  for  the  commerce  of  Boston, 
overlook  one  very  important  circumstance ;  namely,  the  greater 
distance  of  Boston  from  the  West,  as  compared  to  the  other 
ports.  That  distance  is  some  sixty  miles.  That  difference  of 
distance  must  be  annihilated,  both  as  to  time  and  expense, 
before  Boston  can  successfully  compete,  in  this  particular 
branch  of  business,  with  the  other  cities.  Can  merchandise 
trains  be  run  so  much  more  rapidly  as  to  annihilate  the  differ¬ 
ence  of  distance  ?  They  may,  perhaps,  but  necessarily  with 


17 


increased  expense.  But  this  is  not  all.  The  expense  for  the 
sixty  odd  miles  must  be  defrayed  by  some  one.  Who  is  to 
defray  it?  And  if  somebody  were  willing  to  bear  this 
additional  expense,  would  not  the  roads  to  New  York,  Phila¬ 
delphia,  etc.,  be  able  to  underbid  the  road  to  Boston,  and  go 
on  doing  so  until  the  consolidated  road  was  financially  ruined, 
or  must  retire  from  the  contest  ?  And  in  spite  of  this  difficulty 
and  danger,  we  have  the  respectable  testimony  of  Mr.  Richard¬ 
son,  that,  even  now,  the  Western  and  Worcester  Railroads 
carry  freight  as  low  as  the  Pennsylvania  and  New  York  roads. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  what  more  consolidation  can  effect. 

Much  stress  has,  during  the  examination  of  the  subject,  been 
laid  upon  the  fact  that  Massachusetts  has  the  advantage  over 
New  York,  because  the  river  navigation  being  closed  on  an 
average  for  four  months,  the  West  has  no  other  outlet  but  the 
Western  Railroad.  Mr.  Chapin  remarks  on  this  point:  “I 
contend  that  for  four  months  in  a  year,  Boston  is  as  near  the 
West  as  any  other  sea-board  city,  and  can  bring  freight  here 
as  cheaply  as  it  can  be  carried  to  any  other  seaport.”  This  is 
no  doubt  an  advantage,  and  I  am  not  inclined  to  undervalue  it. 
But  I  doubt  whether  a  branch  of  business,  which,  after  four 
months,  ceases  for  the  remaining  eight  months,  can,  on  the 
whole,  be  very  profitable,  or  considered  firmly  established.  It 
naturally  requires  an  equipment  of  the  railroads  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  doing  the  increased  business  of  the  four  months,  which 
must  necessarily  lie  idle  during  the  remaining  eight  months. 
I  touch  upon  this  point  with  diffidence,  because  I  am  too  little 
of  a  business  man,  and  am  too  little  acquainted  with  railroad 
management,  to  claim  the  right  of  having  or  expressing  an 
opinion;  but  the  necessity  of  an  equipment,  which  can  be 
employed  for  one-third  of  the  year  only,  seems  to  me  indis¬ 
putable.  Granting,  however,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument, 
that  this  periodical  increase  of  business  during  the  four  winter 
months  is  profitable,  is  it  dependent  on  consolidation  ?  Cer¬ 
tainly  not. 

But  while  some  of  the  business  men  of  Boston  are  so 

3 


18 


urgent  in  their  demands  upon  the  two  railroads  to  do  all  in 
their  power  —  possibly  at  the  expense  of  some  of  their 
legitimate  duties  to  the  community  at  large — to  aid  the  com¬ 
mercial  interest  of  Boston,  is  it  unfair  to  inquire  whether  the 
business  men  of  Boston  have  done  all  in  their  power  in  pursuit 
of  the  same  object  ?  Have  they  furnished  shipping  to  transport 
to  Europe  and  other  countries  the  produce  which  can  be  brought 
to  Boston  ?*  The  statement  of  Mr.  Chapin  on.  this  point  is 
conclusive.  He  says :  “  When  you  come  to  the  1  rolling 

freight/  the  copper  from  Lake  Superior,  the  cotton  from 
Memphis,  the  flour  from  St.  Louis,  the  provisions  from  Chicago 
and  Cincinnati,  the  Western  roads  will  all  of  them  pro  rata 
(a  new  verb,  but  perfectly  intelligible)  with  us  from  the  place 
it  starts  from  to  this  point ;  and  therefore  the  difference  in  cost, 
in  consequence  of  the  increased  distance,  does  not  fall  wholly 
upon  this  line  of  road,  but  is  divided  over  the  whole  length  of 
the  route,  and  enables  us  to  fill  up  our  line  with  business,  and 
bring  the  freight  forward  to  Boston,  if  we  can  only  get  you  to 
take  it  away.  That  is  the  only  difficulty.  We  might  have 
brought  to  Boston,  last  winter,  any  quantity  of  freight  —  far 
beyond  what  we  have  any  ability  to  bring  here  —  if  there  had 
been  any  outlet  for  it.  There  is  not  so  much  communication 
here  with  Europe  as  there  is  from  New  York.  There  are  no 
steam-freight  lines  from  here,  not  so  much  shipping,  and  the 
communication  is  not  so  frequent.”  And  in  another  place: 
“We  have  brought  freight  from  the  West  to  the  extent  of  our 
(Western  Road)  rolling-stock.  If  there  had  been  a  better 
outlet,  we  could  have  brought  more,  because  the  Boston  and 
•Worcester  Railroad  have  had  rolling-stock  lying  still  all 
winter.”  This  statement  is  corroborated  by  the  very  respect- 


*  A  similar  case  is  discussed  in  the  Boston  Daily  Advertiser  of  Dec.  14  and 
15  ;  namely,  the  want  of  immediate  steamboat  communication  between  Boston 
and  New  Orleans.  An  instance  is  mentioned  of  a  Boston  merchant  haying 
4000  barrels  of  flour  waiting  at  New  Orleans  for  shipment  to  Boston,  and  not 
knowing  how  to  bring  it  to  Boston,  except  by  way  of  New  York. 


19 


able  testimony  of  Mr.  Richardson,  who  declares  that  freight 
from  Boston  to  Liverpool  is  higher  than  from  New  York  to 
Liverpool, —  a  testimony  confirmed  by  Mr.  Tobey. 

The  expressions,  “if  we  can  only  get  you  to  take  it  away,” 
and  “if  there  had  been  any  outlet  for  it,”  are  pregnant  with 
meaning.  The  men  of  business  of  Boston  do  not,  of  course, 
demand  that  the  railroads  are  to  furnish  this  “outlet,”  and  do 
for  them  what  they  ought  to  do  themselves.  And  yet  they 
advocate  the  consolidation  of  the  two  roads,  on  the  ground  that 
consolidation  will  aid  and  increase  the  transportation  of  freight 
from  the  West  to  Boston,  when  confessedly  they  do  not  provide 
the  means  of  “taking  away”  that  quantity  which  the  two 
roads,  in  their  present  condition,  might  deliver  in  Boston. 
The  demand  of  the  men  of  business  of  Boston  would  be  made 
with  better  grace  after  they  had  done  what  they,  and  they 
alone,  can  do;  namely,  furnish  the  means  of  transportation, 
and  at  prices  as  low  as  at  New  York. 

I  ask  again,  would  it  be  wise  and  just  for  the  Legislature  to 
authorize  a  measure  highly  doubtful  in  its  result,  and  which 
would  probably  seriously  affect  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
stockholders,  for  the  benefit  of  parties  who  have  confessedly 
not  yet  done  what  is  absolutely  necessary  to  render  the 
expected  benefit  possible. 

A  misapprehension  appears  to  me  to  lie  at  the  bottom  of 
this  idea  that  the  commercial  interest  of  Boston  requires  the 
consolidation  of  these  roads.  The  misapprehension  to  which 
I  refer  is  the  belief  that  Boston  can  be  made  a  second  New 
York,  competing  with  the  latter  precisely  in  the  same  branches 
of  business  to  which  New  York*owes  so  great  a  portion  of  its 
prosperity.  Nature  is  against  this.  The  geographical  position 
and  conformation  of  Massachusetts  render  such  an  attempt 
abortive.  But  while  Boston  can  not  do  precisely  what  New 
York  does,  it  can  do  a  great  many  things  as  well  as  New  York, 
and  a  great  many  other  things  which  New  York  can  not  do.  I 
entertain  no  doubt  whatever  that  Boston  can  be  a  growing  and 
prosperous  community,  as  indeed  it  is  and  has  been,  but  not 


y 


20 

precisely  after  the  model  of  New  York.  Boston  has  already 
branches  of  commerce  and  industry  of  its  own  with  which  no 
other  city  of  the  Union  can  compete ;  the  capital,  intelligence, 
and  energy  of  Boston,  if  rightly  directed,  will  develop  these 
more  fully,  and  open  new  ones,  and  Boston  will  reach  and 
maintain  an  eminent  position  of  its  own. 

The  gradual  improvement  in  the  mode  of  doing  the  trans¬ 
portation  business  between  the  West  and  Boston,  to  which 
Mr.  Chapin  refers  in  several  places  of  his  statement,  points 
out  the  true  policy.  This  policy  is  to  act  in  concert  with  other 
roads,  by  means  of  agreements,  or  arrangements,  or  contracts, 
or  whatever  other  term  may  be  chosen, —  in  one  word,  by 
co-operation.  This  co-operation  of  independent  roads  should 
be  secured  by  fair,  mutually-beneficial  agreement.  Interest, 
not  springing  from  narrow-minded  and  blind  selfishness,  but 
guided  by  a  liberal,  far-seeing  desire  of  gaining  the  greatest 
advantages  with  the  least  sacrifices,  is  here,  as  in  all  branches 
of  business,  the  surest  basis. 

The  testimony  of  Mr.  Chapin  shows,  that  this  policy  has 
been  pursued  by  the  two  Massachusetts  roads,  and,  apparently, 
with  success.  In  one  place  he  says:  “We  have  arrangements 
now  by  which  we  bill  freight  and  ticket  passengers  over  the 
roads  generally.  There  is  not  a  town  in  Ohio,  with  two 
thousand  inhabitants,  that  can  not  to-day  take  a  bill  of  lading 
in  Boston  and  send  it  south  of  the  Ohio  River,  north  to  the 
lakes,  or  west  to  the  next  largest  railroad ;  so  that,  in  point  of 
fact,  for  a  large  portion  of  this  business,  we  are  already  con¬ 
solidated.  The  arrangements  are  many  of  them  imperfect, 
but  they  are  being  perfected ;  *we  did  not  begin  them  until  ten 
years  ago.” 

In  the  preceding  pages  I  have  endeavored  to  show,  after  a 
careful  examination  of  the  testimony  brought  before  the  Com¬ 
mittee,  that  the  objects  which  the  friends  of  consolidation 
expect  to  gain  by  that  measure  are  not  likely  to  be  gained, 
and  that,  consequently,  it  would  not  be  wise  or  judicious  for 
the  Legislature  to  recommend  or  allow  the  adoption  of  that 


21 


measure.  But  there  are  also  some  positive  objections  to  the 
proposed  measure. 

The  principal  objection  is,  that  great  corporations  are  not 
desirable.  I  am  not  disposed  to  join  in  the  crusade  against 
all  corporations.  Owing  to  the  condition  of  our  country,  the 
greater  distribution  of  property  and  the  consequent  rarity  of 
very  large  fortunes,  owing  to  our  political  institutions,  which 
leave  to  the  enterprise  of  the  citizens  what  under  other  forms 
of  government  is  done  by  the  State,  many  useful  enterprises 
must  be  undertaken  and  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality  of 
corporations,  or  not  undertaken  at  all.  Personal  responsibility 
is  so  apt,  in  corporations,  to  vanish  out  of  sight,  that  there  is 
a  constant  danger  of  things  being  done  by  corporations  which 
would  not  be  attempted  by  individuals  directly  and  personally 
responsible.  This  danger  of  abuse  increases  with  the  extent 
of  the  corporation.  I  readily  grant,  that  frequently  emergencies 
occur  when  a  desirable  object  would  be  gained  more  easily 
and  quickly  if  the  power  of  two  or  more  bodies  were 
concentrated  into  one  guided  by  one  mind.  Just  so  in  our  polit¬ 
ical  condition.  It  frequently  happens  that  the  accomplishment 
of  a  desirable  object  is  delayed  by  the  complicated  machinery 
of  our  responsible  government,  when  it  might  be  secured  at 
once  through  the  action  of  the  one-man  power.  Every  one 
knows  this  and  understands  it ;  yet  few  will  be  found  willing 
to  give  up  the  security  which  our  institutions  afford  to  every 
citizen,  and  every  interest,  for  the  purpose  of  gaining,  in  some 
isolated  instances,  a  greater  efficiency.  I  must  confess,  I  was 
somewhat  surprised  at  the  readiness  with  which  witnesses  and 
counsel,  favoring  the  consolidation  scheme,  advocated  what 
they  called  the  one-man  power.  One  of  the  counsel  went  so 
far  as  to  declare  that  the  corporation  should  be  compelled  to 
carry  out  the  policy  favored  by  him.  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  the  able  and  energetic  counsel  would,  after  some  reflection, 
modify  his  view,  especially  if  he  should  happen  to  be  employed 
by  the  opposite  party. 

That  the  power  of  the  consolidated  corporations  would  be 


22 


great,  and  might  be  dangerous  to  other  interests,  and  to  the 
independence  of  the  State  itself,  admits  of  no  doubt,  although 
the  mere  mention  of  such  danger  was  received  by  some  of  the 
parties  with  scornful  ridicule.  The  example  of  other  States 
proves  this  conclusively.  The  baneful,  selfish  influence  exer¬ 
cised  by  the  New-Jersey  Railroad,  not  only  over  the  internal- 
improvement  policy,  but  over  the  politics  of  that  State,  is 
generally  acknowledged.  It  would  not  be  gratifying  to  the 
self-respect  of  a  Massachusetts  citizen  if  some  future  President 
of  the  consolidated  Western  and  Worcester  Railroads  should 
boast  of  carrying  the  State  of  Massachusetts  in  his  breeches 
pocket.  The  admissions  of  the  able  President  of  the  Michigan 
Central  Railroad,  as  to  the  political  and  legislative  abuses 
connected  with  the  affairs  of  the  New-York  Central  Railroad, 
are  full  of  warning.  The  declaration  of  ^fr.  Twitchell,  that 
he  should  deem  it  his  duty  to  use  his  power  and  influence  for 
the  purpose  of  controlling  or  destroying  a  competing  road, 
struck  me  as  very  significant.  The  case  of  the  Hoosac-tunnel 
enterprise  shows,  to  the  satisfaction  of  any  disinterested,  fair- 
minded  man,  how  much  a  feeble  and  local  enterprise,  in  the 
hands  of  determined  and  persevering  men,  can  accomplish  in 
our  Legislature,  by  the  well-known  legislative  machinery  of  log¬ 
rolling.  All  this  should  deter  us  from  placing  excessive, 
irresponsible,  and  uncontrollable  power  in  the  hands  of  one 
large  corporation,  essentially  governed  and  directed  by  one 
mind.  The  president  of  the  consolidated  road  would  govern  and 
direct  over  two  thousand  men,  who  owe  their  bread  to  him. 
Will  he,  or  will  he  not,  have  the  means  of  deciding  a  closely- 
contested  election  ?  especially,  if  the  principle  enunciated  and 
justified,  some  years  ago,  by  the  agent  of  a  manufacturing 
corporation  in  our  own  State,  be  adopted,  that  a  corporation 
has  a  right  to  regulate  the  voting  of  its  dependents. 

The  possibly,  nay  probably,  injurious  influence  of  the  consoli¬ 
dated  corporation  upon  the  full  development  and  exercise 
of  the  principle  of  competition,  —  a  principle  which  may 
undoubtedly  bo  carried  to  an  unwise  extent,  but  is,  after  all, 


23 


the  very  life  of  a  free  and  satisfactory  condition  of  business,— 
is  another  evident  danger  on  which  I  need  not  dwell,  after  the 
significant  testimony  of  Messrs.  Brooks  and  Twitchell.  The 
former  says :  “  If  the  consolidation  takes  place,  rival  lines  will 
much  less  be  built.”  The  latter  says :  u  Consolidation  would 
be  injurious  to  the  Norwich  and  Nashua  roads,  and  prevent  the 
building  of  the  Gardner  road.  The  Western  road  would  use 
their  influence  and  money  to  prevent  the  building  of  the 
Gardner  road,  even  if  it  were  for  the  interest  of  the  State.” 
It  is  true  that  Mr.  Chapin  says  on  this  point,  “ 1  don’t  think 
consolidation  would  injure  the  Norwich  and  Worcester  Railroad. 
I  think  it  would  not  be  for  the  interest  of  any  road  to  force 
business  out  of  its  natural  channel.  I  don’t  think  there  would 
be  any  profits  made  in  doing  that.  Interest  would  be  one 
of  the  controlling  elements  in  the  government  of  the  road.  I 
don’t  think  the  consolidated  road  would  be  in  favor  of  crushing 
out  the  Norwich  road.  It  is  not  my  opinion  that  it  would  be 
the  policy  of  any  body  to  break  down  the  Norwich  road. 
Such  a  thing  may  have  been  done,  and  may  be  done  again,  but 
if  my  opinion  is  asked,  as  a  railroad  man,  —  a  man  interested 
in  transportation,  which  has  been  my  business  all  my  life,— 
I  would  say,  meet  fair  competition  everywhere,  but  introduce 
no  competition  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  down  any  body.” 
This  is,  indeed,  the  opinion  of  a  man  of  large  experience,  and, 
as  such,  of  great  value,  but  it  is  an  opinion  only.  Mr.  Chapin’s 
character  would  be  a  guaranty,  if  the  management  of  the 
consolidated  roads  were  entrusted  to  him,  that  his  administra¬ 
tion  would  be  fair  and  liberal ;  but  what  assurance  is  there 
that  he,  or  one  like  him,  would  be  the  manager  ? 

This  is  a  brief,  but  I  trust,  intelligible  statement  of  the 
considerations  which  led  me  to  vote  with  the  majority  of  the 
Committee,  that  the  petitioners  have  leave  to  withdraw. 


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